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Abstract Nowadays, the organic nature of business pro-
cesses and the increasingly complex and dynamic business
environment make organizations face severe operational
risks. However, current risk analysis methods of Informa-
tion Technology (IT) resources ignore inter-process cor-
relation and thus inter-process risk propagation. This gap
needs a solution since the rigid alignment of organizations
cause the risks which propagate throughout the whole
organization to be the most serious operational risks. This
paper presents a holistic approach for quantifying risk
propagation in business processes based on the risk anal-
ysis of their underlying IT and human resources. This
approach adapts financial techniques to quantify the level
of risk that average and severe events on IT resources
generate on individual business processes, and to quantify
the risk propagation impact among dependent processes.
This approach was applied to an enterprise modeling case
study to quantify risk propagation for different risk epi-
center scenarios. The results show that the proposed
approach is capable of finding and quantifying both direct
and indirect dependencies among operational assets within
an organization. A high level of accuracy was observed
when comparing the actual value of the process risk and the
projected value considering risk propagation.
Keywords Risk quantification  Propagation analysis 
Spillover effects  Business processes  IT resources 
Event-based systems
1 Introduction
Nowadays, most organizations adopt a process-oriented
organizational structure enabled by IT and human resour-
ces. The systematic nature of this structure usually implies
a greater dependency between operational assets since a
single process or resource could be supporting many other
assets within the organization. Consequently, a risk mate-
rialization tends to exploit these dependencies in order to
spread and cause a greater impact throughout the organi-
zation. Therefore, risk management becomes a critical
discipline to control the organizational behaviour. In par-
ticular, quantitative risk analysis methods prove a useful
and necessary functionality to measure and understand, in
business terms, the true impact of a risk.
Current approaches quantify the risk for an individual
business process (Bai et al. 2012; Fenz 2010; Conforti
et al. 2016) by taking into account the correlation of events
between its underlying resources. However, they ignore
intra-process correlation which avoids quantifying the
propagation of risk among business processes. Analyzing
the correlation between the underlying resources support-
ing the business processes is fundamental to understand
those processes that must be controlled and protected
against contingencies due to their high vulnerability to risk
propagation. Identifying the propagation path of risk is
necessary to discover its real impact and to enable the
mitigating or softening of its occurrence before it ends up
spreading and causing a greater impact in the organization.
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We define the following research question to address the
aforementioned gaps.
RQ How to quantify risk propagation among dependent
business processes and their underlying IT and
human resources?
In a previous work we have defined the BP-VAR
method to quantify the level of risk that events of IT
resources generate for individual business processes
(González-Rojas and Lesmes 2016). In this article, we
have extended this work with two risk analysis capabilities:
quantifying risk propagation among enterprise’s opera-
tional assets, and quantifying process risk in severe IT
resources’ events. We used the b coefficient, typically
applied in the context of finance theory, to measure the
volatility of a business process in comparison with other
operational assets of the enterprise (cf. the market value in
a financial context). The b of a business process changes
when more historical events that generate volatility are
analyzed. These events correspond to variations of the
expected value of quality attributes for IT resources and to
variations of the expected amount of human resources
required to execute process tasks. Although b changes
cannot be predicted, they quantify the risk value of inter-
dependent operational assets. We defined an algorithm with
a set of propagation rules to quantify risk propagation
depending on the epicenter of an undesired event. This
algorithm uses the Value at Risk (VAR) and the Condi-
tional Value at Risk (CVAR) financial techniques to
quantify risks in average and severe events on IT resources
respectively. These techniques and algorithms are auto-
mated in a web application allowing decision-makers to
support risk impact analysis for real and simulated sce-
narios, and to plan business continuity.
This approach was applied within a Latin American
University to analyze risks regarding the interoperability of
operational assets. In this experiment we found that risk
propagates mostly across processes since IT resources
normally do not have a high dependency of each other. The
results show a high level of accuracy in quantifying risk
propagation among business processes and IT resources,
when comparing historical data until datet and the real
data of datetþ1. For example, an error rate between 4% and
15% was found in the value of the dependent assets for a
risk propagation scenario for one IT resource with
CVAR/ ¼ 5%.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the core concepts, requirements, and propagation scenarios
for risk analysis within a network of processes. Section 3
discusses gaps and challenges found in related work. Sec-
tion 4 presents the instantiation of the adopted financial
techniques to the context of information systems and
business processes. Section 5 briefly describes the func-
tionalities of a tool we developed to simulate events that
generate volatility and to quantify and predict risks. Sec-
tion 6 presents the results of applying our risk analysis
method to a case study. Finally, conclusions and future
work are presented in Sect. 7.
2 Preliminaries and Motivation
2.1 Core Concepts
Enterprise modeling approaches create and analyze busi-
ness and IT models to describe complex organizations (a
network of dependent assets). Business modeling involves
strategy, activities’ decomposition (value chain activities,
process groups, business processes, tasks), stakeholders,
functions, services, products, etc. IT modeling decomposes
IT services at different levels: application services, appli-
cation components (information systems), and infrastruc-
ture components (system software, hardware). Our
approach is aimed at quantification and propagation anal-
ysis of risks among enterprise models describing opera-
tional assets.
Operational assets refer to the set of business processes, IT
resources (aka IT services at the level of application
components), and human resources that implement the
business model of an organization. Two assets are directly
correlated if a positive or negative variation in the business
value of one of them would affect the business value of the
other asset in the same direction. Meanwhile, two opera-
tional assets are inversely correlated if for example the fall
of one asset’s value results in an increase of the other’s
value (e.g., if an IT resource is not available, the value of
the resource and its supported processes decrease whereas
the value of a human resource task increases). Operational
assets can have direct dependencies explicitly represented
by enterprise modeling architectures or methodologies but
also indirect or implicit dependencies that have to be dis-
covered to identify spillover effects.
Risk quantification is the estimation of the business impact
(business value in monetary terms) expected from the
volatility of the value of operational assets due to disrup-
tive events. For example, external events such as exchange
rate fluctuations may generate an increase in IT operation
costs, lower prices from market suppliers may cause
changes in IT resources, late support from suppliers may
cause performance degradation of IT resources, and so on.
The events that are internal to the organization but external
to the business unit that is accountable for an operational
asset are also considered as disruptive events
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(e.g., performance degradation of internal IT resources)
since both generate volatility of operational assets.
Risk propagation is the impact on business value spread
across operational assets that results from the occurrence of
a disruptive event. Risk propagation has two main factors
that need to be taken into account: the propagation path
across operational assets, and the impact that this propa-
gation has on other assets different to the risk epicenter.
Thus, the risk propagation should be directly related to the
level and types of correlations that exist between the
operational assets. Therefore, a risk epicenter refers to the
operational asset that is directly affected by a disruptive
event.
2.2 Requirements for Quantifying Risk Propagation
Nowadays, the organic nature of business processes and the
ever more complex and dynamic business environment
make organizations face severe operational risks (Conforti
et al. 2016). Figure 1 illustrates in the archimate language a
simplified view of the enterprise modeling of a Latin
American University, which was analyzed as case study to
validate the proposed risk analysis method. This enterprise
model illustrates the dependencies between two critical
business processes (i.e., Admission, Course inscription)
and critical IT resources supporting them (i.e., Banner
system, Authentication manager, and Database manager).
In this case study, as presented in González-Rojas and
Lesmes (2016), critical business processes are highly
dependent on IT services for their execution and control.
These services provide 11 application services that are
supported by 26 software components. These services can
be assumed as event-based systems when analyzing their
behaviour in terms of events associated with the variance in
the value of quality attributes such availability, perfor-
mance, capacity, and integrity. The high volatility associ-
ated with these services generates volatility within business
processes. For example, 10 disruptive events with 120
occurrences were identified for the aforementioned IT
resources.
The following discusses the requirements we have
identified in the case study to quantify the risk propagation
for individual operational assets and for the interactions
among assets. These requirements delimit the proposed
methods and rules (see Sect. 4).
Req1. Quantify risk on average events We have found
approaches that quantify the risk for an individual business
process by analyzing average disruptive events of short
time recovery and low impact on its underlying resources
(Bai et al. 2012; Fenz 2010; Conforti et al. 2016) (see Sect.
3). However, we have not found formal methods (1) to
quantify the risk of a business process based on IT per-
formance variations, (2) to quantify the risk of an IT
resource for a group of processes, and (3) to forecast the
Fig. 1 Enterprise modeling of the interaction among operational assets
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expected value for operational assets taking into account a
daily time horizon. In general, typical disruption scenarios
of operational assets are related to failures in applications,
databases, and communications that do not involve physi-
cal damage of the computing and communications capa-
bilities. These failures can generate process unavailability
due to the unavailability of IT resources, integrity affec-
tations by inconsistent data shared along process activities,
and low performance and capacity to manage transactions.
Req2. Quantify risk on severe events Additional to the first
requirement, there is a need to support risk quantification
based on severe events that exceed the expected loss value
identified for average events. A formal method is missing
to quantify risk on operational assets based on severe
events and to forecast the expected value for these assets
taking into account a n-day time horizon. Most organiza-
tions endeavour to prepare against these shocking scenar-
ios. Typical shocking scenarios of operational assets are
related to data loss, physical damage or theft of isolated
computing and communications capabilities, failures in the
change controls of software and hardware, and breach of
supplier contractual obligations.
Req3. Quantify risk propagation The materialization of
risks usually impacts at first only one operational asset of
an organization, but then also impacts other correlated
operational assets. The lack of search for and quantification
of risk propagation in joint processes is one of the main
gaps found in risk-aware process management (Suriadi
et al. 2014) (see Sect. 3), and thus, it is the main require-
ment tackled by our approach. Therefore, a risk quantifi-
cation method must be able to find and take into account
the level of direct and indirect dependencies, the risk
propagation path, and the risk propagation impact. Risk
propagation must consider the following analysis scenarios
according to risk epicenters identified in the case study.
• IT resource as risk epicenter A risk materializes the
occurrence of degradation events on quality attributes
of the IT resource, causing a fall in their value and thus
a fall in the resource value. The risk should propagate
towards all those processes that have a significant
correlation with the epicenter (cf. rule I in Sect. 4.3).
For example, a risk concerning the Exams Management
service must propagate to the Undergraduate Admis-
sion process (see Fig. 1). Then, the risk should
propagate horizontally to other processes without
affecting an asset more than once (cf. rule II in Sect.
4.3). Assuming that the risk propagates from the
Undergraduate Admission process to the Course
Inscription process, then the risk should be propagated
from the second process without affecting the first
process again. When propagating horizontally to
multiple assets, the order of the propagation should
be taken into account (cf. rule III and IV in Sect. 4.3).
• Complementary human resources as risk epicenter A
risk materializes the lack of planned resources to
perform process activities. A human resource is com-
plementary if it has a direct correlation with the human
and IT resources supporting the process. In this
scenario, the propagation should occur the same way
as the risk was propagated from an IT resource
epicenter.
• IT resource, with a supplementary resource, as risk
epicenter A supplementary resource has the ability of
relieving another IT or human resource task. In a
scenario where a degradation event impacts an IT
resource which has a supplementary human resource
(see Enrollment Management in Fig. 1), it would be
expected that a significant inverse correlation arises
between the human resource and other IT resources. In
this case, a horizontal propagation at the resource level
from the epicenter should be taken into account for
significant correlated assets. Therefore, if an IT
resource is impacted negatively, the risk will propagate
to the human resource affecting it positively (transfer of
work). Then a vertical propagation towards the process
level should take place. In this case, the impacts should
be aggregated before propagating, so that the positive
impact caused by the human resource will reduce the
negative impact caused by the degradation event in the
IT resource (cf. rule V in Sect. 4.3). After propagating
vertically, there should not be another horizontal
propagation at the process level since one horizontal
propagation has already taken place at the resource
level (cf. rule II in Sect. 4.3).
• Double risk epicenter If multiple disruptive events
occur which affect different resources, the former event
must be identified. This is due to the fact that the risk
propagated by the second event would have a lower
impact since the value of the operational assets has
already been affected. Once the risk generated for the
first event has been established, then it is just a matter
of propagating one risk after the other.
• Process as risk epicenter A process risk is generated by
degradation events at the resource level. Since the risk
should not propagate horizontally at the resource level
(except for supplementary resources), the risk should
propagate vertically towards the processes correlated
with the process epicenter (cf. rule VI and VII in Sect.
4.3). In this vertical propagation, risks should be
quantified for all dependent assets (cf. rule V in Sect.
4.3).
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3 Related Work: Gaps and Challenges for Quantifying
Risk Propagation
Current approaches for risk analysis were assessed
according to their scope (individual vs joint analysis) and
according to their goal: identification and monitoring,
quantification, correlation analysis, propagation in non-
process contexts, and process-related propagation.
Approaches for risk propagation in joint processes The
author in Tallon (2011) used a Delphi technique to identify
spillover effects on business processes due to the miss-
alignment with IT strategy. This author shows through
match surveys that spillover effects propagate from the
focal process through all the whole value chain. Therefore,
indirect dependencies must be identified when propagating
risk. Although this approach targets inter-process risk
propagation, it lacks a formal and automated method to
perform the risk quantification.
Approaches for risk propagation in individual processes
The most complete approaches quantify risk propagation
for individual processes. Bai et al. (2012) quantify risks
due to data error propagation in the information flows
along the process’ activities. The authors use the VAR and
CVAR to quantify business process risks taking into
account the error propagation, the probability of error, and
the availability of error-control resources. This technique
calculates only direct correlations based on the amount of
information that passes from one element to another.
Therefore, risk is only propagated between preceding
activities, ignoring indirect dependencies or spillover
effects.
Mock and Corvo (2005) model and visualize how a
failure (e.g., incorrect data, application failure, misread of
data) is spread across process activities. An analyst has to
identify the failure root cause, to represent the failure
chain, and to link a failure with a resource (hardware,
software, person of charge). The authors in Conforti et al.
(2016) use a sensor-based architecture to share information
about a risk detection among similar process instances.
They provide each process instance with a sensor capable
of measuring its conditions in order to identify important
changes that act as risk contingencies. This propagation
accelerates the detection of risks in other instances under
the execution of the same process. The author in Fenz
(2010) proposes a method to quantify risks by taking into
account the specific importance and the probability of
availability failure of each IT resource that composes a
specific process. The importance of each resource is
defined by the cost of process unavailability. This method
lacks of capabilities to correlate risks within IT resources,
whose impact quantification could also be extended by
analyzing additional degradation events (e.g., performance,
integrity).
Although these approaches allow to analyze and monitor
individual business processes concerning risks, they are
missing capabilities to quantify inter-process risk propa-
gation. The propagation of events within in a business
process (information flows, process instances) can be used
to extend our approach to the analysis of the value and risk
at the different stages of the process execution and not only
as an absolute process value.
Approaches linking risk to business elements Shabnam
et al. (2014) present a risk measurement methodology to
find actors’ dependency relationships across the whole
organizational model. These dependencies are explicitly
identified by analyzing the vulnerability and the criticality
of each element based on their number of incoming and
outgoing information flows. Nevertheless, this methodol-
ogy ignores indirect dependencies. The authors in Caron
et al. (2013) use the Chi squared test to find the correlation
of events extracted with process mining and analyzed with
the help of rule-based compliance checking. Chaudhuri
et al. (2016) model and quantify the performance impact of
risk on a supply chain by surveying expert opinions. The
authors in Bergholtz et al. (2005) allow analysts to com-
bine different business models (i.e., value webs, process
models) to identify risks and to visualize them for miti-
gation purposes.
Although these methods find the type and level of
dependency between business elements, they lack a method
to quantify the impact that a change in one element has on
another one. This requires identifying direct and indirect
correlations among elements, filtering significant correla-
tions, defining a propagation path, quantifying the risk
value of individual elements, and quantifying the risk
propagation.
Approaches for risk propagation in a non-related process
context Some approaches propose methods and tools to
make decisions for security risk treatment plans for infor-
mation systems. Feng et al. (2014) use colony optimization
algorithms to find the most probable propagation path in a
Bayesian network that represent risk factors and their
respective risk propagation probabilities. Konig et al.
(2016) use percolation epidemiology theory as a visual risk
propagation tool in a graph that represents risks and their
propagation probabilities. These methods can be used in a
process-related context to identify correlations between
risk factors and also to identify the propagation path among
elements. However, they lack capabilities for automating
the identification and quantification of risks for individual
elements and also for their propagation on a network of
elements. This requires the identification of implicit
dependencies among business elements and their linkage.
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4 A Holistic Approach for Risk Analysis in a Network
of Processes and Resources
Our holistic risk analysis approach offers three methods to
tackle the identified quantification requirements: (1) to
quantify risks of average disruptive events concerning
individual assets, (2) to quantify risks of severe disruptive
events concerning individual assets, and (3) to identify and
quantify risk propagation among operational assets. Sec-
tion 6 illustrates the quantification of risks using these
methods for the case study.
4.1 Risk Quantification on Average Events
We created the BP-VAR method to quantify the current
and expected values that a business process can deliver to
the organization by analyzing the performance of the
leveraging IT resources (cf. Req1 in Sect. 2.2).
The current value of a business process is quantified by
aggregating a percentage of the current value of each IT
resource according to the criticality of the resource to
execute the process. The current value of an IT resource is
quantified by adding the expected incomes of supported
business processes, the penalties on level agreements vio-
lations, the costs associated with disruptive events, and the
income losses due to performance degradation (González-
Rojas 2015). A value fall depends on IT resources’
volatility generated by degradation events of their quality
attributes (i.e., availability, capacity, performance, integ-
rity), by the continuous changes in the service providers’
costs, and by the materialization of business threats. These
discrete events and the resulting monetary values must be
monitored and stored continuously through time for mod-
eling the continuous behaviour of the operational assets.
The expected value quantifies a range of values within
which the value of the process will be in the next unit of
time (n-days). The BP-VAR adapted the VAR financial
technique to quantify the total loss exposure, in monetary
terms, that is generated on individual business processes by
degradation events on their underlying IT resources
(González-Rojas 2015). The VAR assumes that external
events (i.e., Market Risk) brings a high volatility over
enterprise incomes over time, and thus, the volatility of an
enterprise asset must be measured by analyzing a series of
discrete events (at least daily) to quantify its potential
Downside Risk (e.g., losses in costs and incomes per
downtime) or Upside Risk (e.g., winnings in incomes per
efficiency).
The VAR can be calculated by different methods. The
historical method assumes that the risk factor of an asset
will behave as its historical values did. The variance-co-
variance method assumes that the risk factor follows a
normal distribution and takes into account only the values
that are above the chosen / confidence level, therefore,
ignoring severe events that are beyond the / level (Yamai
and Yoshiba 2005). The monte-carlo method generates
random variables (disruptive events) for simulation of risk
factors.
The BP-VAR uses the historical data of events gener-
ated by the volatility of quality attributes on IT resources
(cf. discrete events) to quantify the current value of an
individual process throughout time and then it uses a
confidence level to quantify the expected resource and
process risk values. For example, when calculating the
VAR in days of a process (P) valued in dollars with a
confidence level of /%, the results indicate that there is a
/% probability that P will lose VAR dollars or more of its
value the next day.
4.2 Risk Quantification on Severe Events
We propose an extension to the aforementioned method to
quantify risks on severe events (cf. Req2 in Sect. 2.2) by
adopting the CVAR financial technique [also called
expected shortfall (ES)]. The CVAR ‘‘is the conditional
expectation of loss given that the loss is beyond the VAR
level’’ (Yamai and Yoshiba 2005). The mathematical def-
inition of this technique according to Yamai and Yoshiba
(2005) is as follows, where X is a random variable that
represents the loss of a given asset and a represents the
confidence level used to calculate its VAR and CVAR:
CVARaðXÞ ¼ E½XjX > VARaðXÞ ð1Þ
The CVAR technique gives a range of values from the
minimum expected loss to infinity (Yamai and Yoshiba
2005), whereas the VAR gives as a result a range of
potential losses. For example, if a portfolio (group of
assets) q had a VARða¼5%ÞðXÞ ¼  20% (highly deviated
from the normal mean) working with periods of time of 1
day, then q has a 5% chance of losing 20% or more of its
value the next day. Instead, the CVARða¼5%Þ gives an
average expected loss for the worst 5% possible events,
which is a much more useful and accurate result when
quantifying severe events.
Other forecasting techniques such as time series models
(e.g., averaging models, exponential smoothing) and linear
regression were discarded since they not take into account
those exceptional cases outside the trend and since they are
not specific to risk analysis.
The proposed approach quantifies the CVAR of an
operational asset by analyzing its historical values to cal-
culate the VAR and then getting the expected value by
calculating the average of all those values beyond the
VAR. Despite this method can only forecast events
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previously observed, the CVAR will analyze risk on severe
events that are under the control of an organization.
Quantifying the risk for a business process q with a
confidence level a by using the historical method of the
CVAR, it is necessary to have a considerable amount of
historical values of the given process with the same peri-
odicity. Assuming the availability of n?1 historical daily
values for q, it is possible to obtain n returns for q by
calculating the perceptual difference between each histor-
ical value and its precursor. Afterwards, the n return must
be arranged in ascending order and the values of the a 
nth value will be the historical VARðaÞ. Finally, the CVAR
corresponds to the average value of those returns that are
below the historical VAR.
4.3 Quantification of Risk Propagation
The aforementioned methods quantify risks for individual
business processes without quantifying the risk propagation
among a network of dependent operational assets. Risk
propagation requires determining the type of correlation
between operational assets, and also quantifying the impact
that a change in one asset has on another (cf. Req3 in Sect.
2.2).
We specialized the beta coefficient (b) from financial
risk to operational risk for a group of operational assets to
find the type and level of correlation among processes, IT
resources, and human resources. In finance, the beta coef-
ficient is a measure of the volatility of a given asset value
to the movements of the overall market (Choe 2016). For
example, if an asset u has a b of 1.2 with respect to the 10-
year bonus (which normally represents the market because
of its almost null risk), it would mean that u would be 20%
more volatile than the market. In other words, if the value
of the 10-year bonus increases or decreases 10%, then the
value of u would increase or decrease 12% (b 10%)
respectively. Other correlation techniques such as the
Spearman’s and Pearson’s coefficients (Hauke and Kos-
sowski 2011) and the VAR with correlation, which uses
Pearson’s coefficient to calculate the value of a portfolio,
were discarded since they do not quantify the impact that
the movement of one asset has over another one.
Equation 2 presents the mathematical formula to cal-
culate the b coefficient as defined by Choe (2016). In this
formula, l is the market, u is the given asset, Cov is the
covariance, q is the correlation coefficient, and bðu;lÞ is the
beta coefficient of u with respect to l. Notice that the order







We instantiated this formula for measuring the movement
in value of an operational asset (business process or IT
resource) with respect to the movements in value of the set
of operational assets (cf. Market). The covariance, corre-
lation coefficient and standard deviations between two
operational assets is calculated from their historical values
(see BP-VAR). We consider that a movement in the value
of an operational asset can be originated from events that
are external to the business unit that is accountable for the
asset. For example, management decisions on investment
and security policies that increase IT operation costs,
changes in IT resources due to new IT tendencies or lower
prices from market suppliers, volatility in the quality
attributes of IT resources from suppliers, etc.
Figure 2 illustrates in the Archimate language some b
coefficients that can be calculated between a subset of the
operational assets presented in the case study. Two b
coefficients are calculated for each duple of operational
assets (bðe1;e2Þ and bðe2;e1Þ), generating a matrix relating all
operational assets. Explicit b coefficients are identified
from direct dependencies specified in enterprise modeling
initiatives, whereas implicit b coefficients are discovered
from indirect dependencies by performing correlation
analysis. Each b quantifies the impact that the material-
ization of a risk has on other operational asset.
We defined a set of rules to determine the correct path to
propagate risk based on the epicenter of the value move-
ment: in IT resources, in complementary resources, in an
IT resource with a supplementary resource, in multiple
resources, and in a process. These rules cover the scenarios
identified in the presented case study (see Sect. 2.2) to
avoid deadlocks and double impact quantification of the
same operational asset.
R1 Only significant b coefficients should be taken into
account. This rule discards all the b coefficients that
have an absolute value below lower than a value of
significance 1 established depending on the user
ideals. Afterwards, it would be expected to end
Fig. 2 b coefficients among operational assets
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without significant b coefficient between the epicen-
ter and any other assets.
R2 There should be only 1 horizontal propagation
among assets of the same nature (process or
resource) per disruptive event.
R3 An affected asset should try to propagate to all the
assets that are significantly correlated to it without
violating other rules.
R4 When propagating horizontally, each asset should be
affected only once. An asset that is affected by the
risk propagation from another asset must try to
propagate the risk to a significantly correlated asset
that has not yet propagated by ordering the affected
assets from the most affected to the least affected.
This process should be repeated until all the affected
assets have tried propagating.
R5 When propagating vertically among assets of differ-
ent nature, the impact caused by multiple processes
to a resource or by multiple resources to a process
should be aggregated before propagating, instead of
only taking one of them. A horizontal propagation is
required to capture all the impacts caused by the
correlated assets of the same nature.
R6 The propagation should be done first horizontally
from the epicenter in a resource level and then
vertically to the processes level. If there are not
significant correlated resources, then the risk should
propagate vertically to the processes, then propagate
horizontally in the process level and finally propagate
back vertically to the resources.
R7 The propagation should not impact the resource that
was the epicenter.
The risk propagation is quantified by analyzing three
inputs: the matrix of b coefficients, the risk value of indi-
vidual assets, and the risk epicenter. First, the standard
deviation of all b coefficients, that were gathered auto-
matically by correlating the operational assets, is calculated
(e.g., 0.33). This value is multiplied for the number of
deviations a business expert provides (e.g., 0.5) to discard
non-significant b (i.e., b below 0.16). Then, degradation
events on the performance of quality attributes of IT
resources must be captured manually or automatically.
When a degradation event is triggered over an operational
asset (i.e. risk epicenter), the value fall rate of a correlated
asset is computed by multiplying the value fall rate of the
affected asset by their corresponding b. Finally, the risk of
a correlated asset is quantified by multiplying its value fall
rate and its individual risk value quantified with the BP-
VAR method. For example, assume that a resource (r) has a
value of 100, that a dependent process (p) has a value of
200, that their bðp;rÞ ¼ 0:4, and that the resource is expected
a value fall rate of 10% due to degradation events
(cf. CVAR). Then, if a degradation event is triggered on
the resource, the risk is propagated to the process with a
value fall rate of 4%. This change in value triggers a new
risk epicenter in a dependent asset, and thus, the propa-
gation rules must be applied to quantify risks for the net-
work of processes and resources.
5 A Tool for Quantifying Risk Propagation
The aforementioned quantification methods were imple-
mented into a web application to validate and simulate
scenarios of risk propagation. This application follows two
architectural styles: Model-View-Controller (MVC) and
component-based. Functionalities, models, and even data
are encapsulated in an isolated process-specific component
to ease its evolution. The process-specific component
provides the following services:
• Daily risk value quantification: Fig. 3 illustrates the
next-day risk value for the Banner System IT resource
when simulating a degradation event of its availability
(up to 15%). This value exceeds the desired limits
(70–99.999%) degrading the IT resource. With this
event a downside risk of 50.000 USD can be quantified
by the tool when comparing the current and simulated
values. The volatility of the resource value is quantified
by expected losses due to incomes and agreements
penalties.
• N-Day risk value quantification: Using series of
historical events of the values variation of the quality
attributes affecting an IT resource, a simulation of the
Fig. 3 Daily risk value simulation for an IT resource
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n-day resource value is performed, with a defined
confidence level.
• Daily risk value quantification with correlation: From
series of historical resource values, a simulation of the
next-day resource value is performed, and a compar-
ative report is presented, now taking into account the
resource’s correlation.
• Quality attributes risk-correlation quantification: From
an event of an alteration of one or multiple values of a
risk level related to a quality attribute affecting an IT
resource, a simulation of the new correlation value and
therefore the next-day resource value is performed and
a comparative report is presented. The variation of the
resource value is generated by a degradation event.
• Quantification of risk propagation: From an event of a
value alteration in one or more IT resources, the value
propagation analysis is performed, generating a prop-
agation graph that clearly indicates the direction and
magnitude of the propagation effect across the whole
operational assets.
The next section illustrates these functionalities in terms of
the identified risk quantification scenarios.
6 Validation
6.1 Subjects, Design, and Variables
We designed three experiments that compare historical
data of risk quantified until datet and the real data of
datetþ1. The error rate and accuracy measures are calcu-
lated in these experiments.
Dataset description We used the historical data of the
operational assets described in the case study (see Sect.
2.2) to validate the proposed method. The direct depen-
dencies between processes and IT resources have been
quantified in a previous work (González-Rojas 2015). The
result of that empirical study is an enterprise modeling
dataset1 that contains approximately 13,500 elements with
analysis data for the identified dependencies. The expected
daily incomes represent the average of the actual incomes
for final business processes received in 1 year. Costs are
characterized by the associated IT resource, a concept
related to the total cost of ownership (acquisition, support,
communications, etc.), and the corresponding amount of
money. Agreements on IT resources are represented by its
type (service, operational, underpinning contract), the cli-
ent or beneficiary (e.g., a customer, a business unit), the
provider or whoever is responsible for the resource, the
validity time, the related quality attribute if it this applies,
the different service levels with lower and higher expected
values, and the monetary penalty for agreement violation.
Risks concerning IT resources are characterized by the risk
factor, the impact (measured from 1-Very low to
5-Catastrophic), the frequency of occurrence (measured
from 1-Exceptional to 5-Frequent), and the associated
threats. Events degrading IT resources are represented by a
quality attribute (i.e., capacity, availability, performance,
integrity), the ideal value (the limit), an expected minimum
value, an expected maximum value, and the current value
stored with a timestamp.
This dataset contains a thousand records of values for
quality attributes (i.e., availability, integrity, capacity, and
performance) that were captured for each related IT
resource during 12 months. The value of these quality
attributes was gathered by the coordinator of the IT oper-
ation area of the enterprise by monitoring almost daily.
Then the value of the processes was valuated individually
(González-Rojas and Lesmes 2016) and additional data of
IT resources’ performance regarding quality attributes was
gathered during 6 months.
The historical data series of values obtained for quality
attributes were used to quantify the volatility of the IT
resources’ value. These values were used as input for sta-
tistical tools to obtain the mean and standard deviation (r)
parameters that fit the normal distributions assumed for
each quality attribute. For example, the Authentication
Manger resource in terms of integrity behave with a
mean ¼ 0:332 and r ¼ 0:161. Then a weighted deviation
was calculated for each IT resource. We assume that an IT
resource behaves without a specific tendency since the risk
value quantified by datet is probably going to be the same
(its mean) for datetþ1. In the case of a degradation in a
quality attribute, the value of the IT resource is assumed to
change within a belt distribution around the value of datet.
6.2 First Experiment: Risk Analysis on Individual
Assets
Setup This experiment compares the quantification of risk
when using the VAR and CVAR instantiation for indi-
vidual assets. We compare the current value of a process
for a certain date, quantify the expected risk for the fol-
lowing day, and compare that forecasting with the actual
value of the process on the next day. The same analysis is
performed for an IT resource to understand the trigger of
the risk.
Results Figure 4 illustrates the current value ($395.408
USD) for the Undergraduate Admission process at a par-
ticular date (2015-04-26). It also illustrates the expected
downside risk for the next day (CVAR ¼ $363:999 USD1 The risk quantification dataset can be found at: https://github.com/
governit/EnterpriseModelling.
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and VAR ¼ $235:858 USD) by assuming a confidence
level of 95%. The results show a 61% of VAR accuracy
and a 94% of CVAR accuracy when comparing these
forecasting results with the actual process value ($385.966
USD) on the next day (2015-04-27).
The process value is obtained by aggregating the value
of its three underlying IT resources for both datet and
datetþ1: Authentication ($t 132.490 USD vs $tþ1 122.918
USD), Banner ($t 105.419 USD vs $tþ1 105.549 USD), and
Database ($t 157.498 USD vs $tþ1 157.498 USD). This
shows that the downside risk was quantified for a degra-
dation of the leveraging IT Authentication resource, which
was generated by a variation event on the quality attribute
capacity.
Figure 5 illustrates the current value of the degraded IT
authentication resource ($167.710 USD) in terms of the
group of processes at the same date (2015-04-26). The area
under the curve (at the right side) represents the probability
of the resource to increase or decrease its value to a value
within this area. When comparing the expected downside
risk for the next day (CVAR ¼ $154:467 USD and VAR ¼
$125:875 USD), by assuming a confidence level of 95%,
with the actual resource value ($155.592 USD) on the next
day (2015-04-27), the VAR obtained an 81% of accuracy
whereas the CVAR metric had a 99% of forecasting
accuracy.
The results of the CVARða¼5%Þ denoted a better pre-
diction than the VARða¼5%Þ. This is because the CVAR
considers the 5% higher impact events faced by the
resource, whereas the VAR considers a large range of
events within the given probability.
6.3 Second Experiment: Risk Analysis on Joint Assets
Setup We calculated the b coefficient in both directions for
every possible combination of two operational assets
(processes and IT resources) based on their historical value
data. Afterwards, a severe risk for any of the operational
assets was quantified by using the historical CVAR tech-
nique. Then, we recreated each of the analysis scenarios
according to the risk epicenter (see Sect. 2.2) by comparing
the current value of operational assets at a specific date and
the projected values of risk propagation when simulating
disruptive events for those assets. To do this it was nec-
essary to add a dummy human resource to the baseline case
study in order to analyze risk propagation on scenarios with
complementary and supplementary resources. Therefore,
generic b coefficients between the operational assets and
the human resource were added.
We validated the defined risk epicenters’ scenarios (see
Sect. 2.2) by applying the defined propagation rules to the
operational assets of the case study (see Sect. 4.3). We used
the CVARða¼5%Þ to quantify the impact of the materialized
risk for the three scenarios with IT resources as epicenter.
For these scenarios, a degradation event in the Banner
System (availability ¼ 15%) was simulated for a particular
date (2015-04-28). Then, direct and indirect dependencies
were compared before and after risk propagation, and the
quantified propagated value for each operational asset was
compared with the actual value on next day.
Results for risk propagation with an IT resource as epi-
center Figure 6 illustrates the propagation path used to
quantify risk for a subset of the operational assets of the
case study. There were no significantly correlated resources
to propagate horizontally starting from the epicenter
(Banner System). Therefore, risk propagated vertically
towards both processes since they were both significantly
correlated to the IT resource.
Since both processes were already affected, no other
horizontal propagation was made at the process level.
Instead, risk propagated vertically to the Authentication IT
resources because of the negative variation in value of the
Course Inscription process (a disruptive event at process
level). Low error rates were obtained when comparing risk
quantified on propagation with the actual value: 12% for
the Banner System (actual value ¼ $125:646 USD), 6%
for the Authentication Manager resource
(actual value ¼ $146:744 USD), 7% for the Course
Inscription process (actual value ¼ $238:387 USD), and
15% for the Undergraduate Admission process
(actual value ¼ $359:398 USD).
Results for risk propagation with a human resource as
epicenter Figure 7 illustrates the propagation path from a
complementary human resource that degrades its
Fig. 4 Risk quantification with confidence level of 95%
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availability of resources by 20%. For this scenario we
assumed significant b coefficients among the simulated
human resource and processes (bðp1;s3Þ ¼ 0:23 and
bðp2;s3Þ ¼ 0:4) since we did not have the historical data of
the resource required to use the CVAR technique. Lower
error rates were obtained when comparing risk quantified
on propagation with the actual value: 4% for the Banner
System (actual value ¼ $125:646 USD), 8,3% for the
Authentication Manager resource
(actual value ¼ $146:744 USD), 1,4% for the Course
Inscription process (actual value ¼ $238:387 USD), and
3,4% for the Undergraduate Admission process
(actual value ¼ $359:398 USD). In this scenario risk
propagated horizontally among business processes since
the Undergraduate Admission process was not impacted
previously. Although IT resources keep operating as
expected, the lack of people to use them impact their value
since the processes do not perform as expected.
Results for risk propagation for an IT resource with a
supplementary resource Figure 8 illustrates the propagation
path to quantify risk in the absence of the Authentication IT
resource and with the Banner System IT resource as the
epicenter. We assumed that the b coefficients are inversely
related between IT resources and human resources since
they are supplementary resources (negative correlation).
There were no correlated resources to propagate horizon-
tally from the epicenter (Banner System). Therefore, risk
propagated vertically to both processes since they were
both significantly correlated to the IT resource. Since both
processes were already affected, no other horizontal
propagation was made at the process level. Instead, risk
propagated vertically to a simulated human resource from
both processes. The obtained error rates are the same as the
ones obtained for the IT resource epicenter and for both
processes of the first scenario. This is because the supple-
mentary human resource reduced the negative impact
caused by the missing IT resource. However, an additional
method to quantify risk on human resources is still
required.
Results for risk propagation with double risk epicenter This
scenario was already evidenced during the first and third
Fig. 5 VAR and CVAR quantification in an IT resource
Fig. 6 Risk propagation for an IT resource epicenter
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scenarios since a variation in the value of a process value,
as a consequence of a risk propagated from an IT resource,
propagates risk to underlying resources.
6.4 Third Experiment: Correlated Risk Analysis
Setup Three types of risk analysis scenarios performed on
individual processes (stable, downside risk, and upside
risk) are compared with and without the correlation com-
ponent. The quantitative results without correlation were
taken from González-Rojas and Lesmes (2016). The inter-
process correlation presented in this paper enabled the
inclusion of additional relationships and information to
enrich the results. Given the fact that the quantification of
the risk propagation does not provide a range of values,
only one of the downside or upside risks is analyzed. A
1-day VAR projection with confidence value of 65% is
analyzed for all scenarios.
Results for a stable scenario. Table 1 presents the accuracy
results for a stable scenario that was identified from events
in the time from 2015-04-20 to 2015-04-24. The set of
recorded values of the processes experienced a low varia-
tion, mainly due to the constant behaviour of the quality
attributes levels of their supporting IT resources.
The accuracy of quantifying the expected value for a
stable scenario increased with the correlation. For example,
the expected value without the propagation component was
quantified within the 257.094 USD and 267.007 USD for
the Course Inscription process, whereas the current value
stored at 2015-04-24 was 263.784 USD. Similarly, the
current value stored at 2015-04-24 for the Undergraduate
Admission process (396.548 USD) is within the range of
expected values (385.238 USD and 399.846 USD). In
contrast, the risk quantified by the correlation predicted
values with low variations from the actual value. A vari-
ation of 0,502% was obtained for the Course Inscription
process (expected value ¼ 263:365 USD), and a variation
of 0.701% for the Undergraduate Admission process
(expected value ¼ 395:293 USD).
Results for a downside risk scenario Table 2 presents the
accuracy results for a downside risk scenario that was
identified from 2015-04-24 to 2015-04-25. During that
Fig. 7 Risk propagation for a complementary human resource
epicenter
Fig. 8 Risk propagation for an IT resource with a supplementary
resource
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period of time the set of recorded values of the processes
experienced a significant decreasing variation, mainly
produced by the degradation of a leveraging IT resource
(Banner System).
The analysis of risk propagation decreased the accuracy
level when quantifying the expected value for a downside
scenario. We assume this is because we are using the
CVAR with the same VAR confidence level
(CVARða¼35%Þ), which increases the potential impact. For
example, the expected value without the propagation
component was quantified within 258.796 USD and
268.778 USD for the Course Inscription process, whereas
the current value stored on 2015-04-25 was 250.420 USD.
Similarly, the expected value for the Undergraduate
Admission process was quantified within 388.777 USD and
403.518 USD, whereas the current value stored on 2015-
04-25 was 374.203 USD. For both processes a variation of
3,34% and 3,89% respectively were generated from the
projection limits. In contrast, the risk quantified by the
propagation component shows higher variations such as
- 8.936% for the Course Inscription process
(expected value ¼ 240:213 USD), and - 12.478% for the
Undergraduate Admission process
(expected value ¼ 347:067 USD).
Results for an upside risk scenario Table 3 presents the
accuracy results for an upside risk scenario that was
identified from 2015-04-16 to 2015-04-17. During that
period of time the set of recorded values of the processes
experienced a significant increase in their value, mainly
produced by the optimal performance of their three
underlying IT resources.
The analysis of risk propagation increased the accuracy
level when quantifying the expected value for an upside
risk scenario. For example, the quantification of risk
without the propagation component was estimated within
247.501 USD and 257.088 USD for the Course Inscription
process, whereas the current value stored on 2015-04-17
was 265.737 USD. Similarly, the expected value for the
Undergraduate Admission process was estimated within
373.564 USD and 387.721 USD, whereas the current value
stored on 2015-04-17 was 399.266 USD. For both pro-
cesses a variation of 3.25% and 2.89% respectively were
generated from the projection limits. In contrast, the risk
quantification predicted by the propagation component
presented a variation of 4.267% for the Course Inscription
process (expected value ¼ 263:033 USD), and a variation
of 5.959% for the Undergraduate Admission process
(expected value ¼ 403:325 USD).
The propagation component proposed to quantify risk
increased the accuracy of the analyzed scenarios and
allowed to take into account a higher number of variables
and dependencies among operational assets.
6.5 Threats to Validity
The proposed risk quantification method depends highly on
the availability of historical analysis data regarding the
operational assets. The lack of complete and consistent
information can limit its adoption in enterprises. To guar-
antee a higher level of accuracy for risk quantification, the
proposed method should be validated for the complete set
of operational assets involved in the case study. However,
this information is not yet gathered.
Table 1 Accuracy results for a
stable scenario
Course inscription Undergraduate admission
Downside risk (%) Upside risk (%) Downside risk (%) Upside risk (%)
Without b 97.5 98.78 97.15 99.17
With b 99.85 – 99.69 –
Table 2 Accuracy results for a
downside risk scenario
Course inscription Undergraduate admission
Downside risk (%) Upside risk (%) Downside risk (%) Upside risk (%)
Without b 96.66 92.67 96.11 92.17
With b 95.93 – 92.75 –
Table 3 Accuracy results for
an upside risk scenario
Course inscription Undergraduate admission
Downside risk (%) Upside risk (%) Downside risk (%) Upside risk (%)
Without b 93.14 96.75 93.57 97.11
With b 98.99 – – 98.99
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We instantiated the VAR and CVAR financial tech-
niques by using the historical and variance-covariance
methods. However, these methods assume that an opera-
tional asset will behave as it did in the past. This can limit
the prediction results by considering only those event risks
that have already been observed and registered. We
assumed a 1-day recovery time when triggering average
and severe disruptive events on IT assets. However, the
impact for catastrophic events, those that go beyond the
control of a mature organization and with an uncertain
recovery time, exceed the prediction of the proposed
method extensively. Some examples of catastrophic events
are the loss of a data center, a cyber-attack which causes
multiple utility and financial systems to collapse, the
internet crash. Accordingly, temporal restrictions can be
incorporated into the proposed approach to support a non-
lineal analysis.
7 Conclusion
Our risk analysis proposal is capable to quantify the impact
of a risk taking into account its propagation. Thanks to the
functionality provided by the b coefficient our proposal
quantifies risks by considering the correlation between all
the different operational assets regardless whether they
have a direct or indirect dependency. This is a very
important functionality, since it enables to find and con-
sider inter-process correlation and spillover effects. We
successfully instantiated and integrated both the b coeffi-
cient’s propagation capabilities and the CVAR risk quan-
tification capabilities for analyzing a network of inter-
dependent processes and IT resources.
Validation results show a low error rate over the per-
formed estimations, which analyze particular behaviours of
operational assets. However, further research is required to
analyze the estimation error over an entire timeframe. The
lack of public available datasets can be the main reason
why current state of the art does not provide solutions for
quantifying inter-processes risk propagation. Quantifying
risk propagation requires an input model which represents
the wide amount of process and IT assets, as well as the
large amount of analysis data within their dependencies
(e.g., risks, costs, incomes). The high complexity and effort
required to empirically build the described dataset prevents
our approach from being validated extensively with more
case studies.
The paper assumes that risks originate only in IT
resources and from there propagate to processes and other
resources. The quantification of risk propagation should be
extended to more dimensions involved in business opera-
tions. First, the validation of correlation scenarios with
human resources needs further research since the results
obtained were based on assumptions and generic data.
Additional analysis dimensions such as time constraints for
risk propagation and SLA violations in the performance of
business processes must be modeled. Finally, further
research is required to analyze propagation scenarios with
multiple epicenters in order to carry out a synchronous risk
quantification.
In addition, we plan to automate the identification of the
metrics and events of IT resource’s quality attributes to
avoid manual and human dependent actions that limit the
adoption of the proposed method. An enterprise-wide
adoption of this approach will require the integration with
enterprise modeling tools to automate the enriched speci-
fication of inter-dependent operational assets, and a stan-
dardized format to consolidate information from existing
IT management processes and tools (configuration, service
level, financial).
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